Islamist Militancy The Lashkar-i-Tayyeba by Sikand, Y.
Current Issues1 4 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  9 / 0 2
South As i a
Y O G I N DE R  S I K A N D
One of the leading Islamist groups active in Pakistan
and Kashmir today is the Lashkar-i-Tayyeba, or 'The
Army of the Pure'. Founded in 1993 and banned in
early 2002, the Lashkar comprises largely Pakistani
militants who had immersed themselves in the jihad
in Afghanistan. After the expulsion of the Soviets,
these m u j a h i ds turned their attention to fresh pas-
tures, Kashmir being one of them. The Lashkar's ide-
ology bears close resemblance to that of the A l - Q aci-
d a and preaches a large-scale jihad against the 'ene-
mies of Islam' in order to establish a unified Islamic
s t a t e .
Islamist Militancy
The Lashkar-i-T a y y e b a
sion in the number of Islamic seminaries in
the country, many of which are sponsored by
the Saudis and preach a conservative yet mil-
itant form of Islam, and the active sponsor-
ship of such madrasas by the Pakistani state,
under and after General Zia-ul Haq (d. 1988).
Most importantly, however, the Afghan jihad
against the Soviets saw a great expansion of
resources for groups such as the Ahl-i-Ha-
dith, with massive amounts of aid, in the
form of money and arms, pouring in from
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Many
Ahl-i-Hadith and other Sunni madrasas
emerged at this time as training grounds for
militants. From being a relatively minor
group in Pakistan's Islamic landscape, the
Ahl-i-Hadith grew, by the end of the 1980s,
into a major force, with scores of madrasas all
over the country, and several newspapers
and journals articulating its vision of an Is-
lamic revolution. With new 'enemies' to tar-
get – the Russians in Afghanistan and the In-
dians in Kashmir – the Ahl-i-Hadith, hitherto
marginalized and shunned by most Hanafi
Muslims, now began carefully expanding its
own support base in the country.
In 1986 the Ahl-i-Hadith set up the Markaz
Dacw a t wa'l Irshad, based in a sprawling 160-
acre campus at Muridke, a town some 30
kilometres from Lahore, to train m u j a h i d i n t o
fight the Soviets. Money for the establish-
ment of the centre is alleged to have been
received from among other sources, from
the Saudi dissident Usama bin Laden. As the
Markaz's activities rapidly grew, it was decid-
ed to divide its work into two separate but
related sections: the educational and the ji-
hadist. Thus, in 1993, the Markaz established
its separate military wing, the Lashkar. The
Lashkar later set up four training centres in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Markaz authori-
ties claim that the militants produced at
these centres have played a leading role in
armed struggles, first in Afghanistan, and
then in countries as far afield as Bosnia,
Chechenya, Kosovo, the southern Philip-
pines, Kashmir and 'in other areas where
Muslims are fighting for freedom'.*
According to one report, in recent years
the spread of the Markaz/Lashkar in Pakistan
has been phenomenal, and today it has
some five hundred offices all over the coun-
try, most of them in Punjab, which operate
as recruitment centres for would-be m u-
j a h i d i n. At its Muridke headquarters, the
Markaz runs an Islamic school and university,
most of whose students are local Pakistanis,
with some Kashmiris from the Indian-ruled
part of the state, and several Afghans and
Arabs. Established in 1994, several hundred
students have already graduated from the
school. Scores of smaller schools run on the
same lines have been set up in various other
parts of Pakistan, and by mid-2001 their
number was said to be almost 130, with
some 15,000 students and 800 teachers on
their rolls.
Lashkar ideology
The Lashkar sees Islam as a perfect, all-em-
bracing system. For establishing an Islamic
system, an Islamic state, which will impose
the s h a r ica as the law of the land, is neces-
sary. If such a state were to be set up and all
Muslims were to live strictly according to
'the laws that Allah has laid down', then, it is
believed, 'they would be able to control the
whole world and exercise their supremacy'.
Since Islam is seen as the very antithesis of
nationalism, it demands the establishment
of one universal Islamic state, ruled by a sin-
gle k h a l i f a h. Thus, the present division of
the Muslims into many nation-states must
be overcome.
The struggle for the establishment of the
Islamic Caliphate can take various forms,
peaceful as well as violent. Islam, the
Lashkar admits, is 'a religion of peace and
harmony', and seeks to 'eliminate mischief
and disorder, and to provide peace, not only
to Muslims but all of humanity'. However,
Muslims are commanded to take to armed
struggle, or jihad, to defend their co-reli-
gionists suffering from the oppression of
others. Such a situation is said to prevail
over much of the world today. While jihad in
defence of Islam and of Muslims labouring
under oppression is presented as a libera-
tion struggle, it is also seen as a means for
Islam to 'prevail on this earth', for Islam is
seen as the only true religion. Armed jihad
must continue 'until Islam, as a way of life,
dominates the whole world and until Allah's
law is enforced everywhere in the world'.
The subject of armed jihad runs right
through the writings and pronouncements
of the Markaz/Lashkar and is, in fact, the
most prominent theme in its discourse. In-
deed, its understanding of Islam may be
seen as determined almost wholly by this
preoccupation, so much so that its reading
of Islam seems to be a product of its own
political project. 'Sufism', it insists, 'has been
designed with no other purpose than to
dampen the spirit of jihad'.
India is a special target for the Markaz's
m u j a h i d i n. The Markaz sees the jihad as
going far beyond the borders of Kashmir
and spreading through all of India. The final
goal is to extend Muslim control over what
is seen as having once been Muslim land,
and, hence, to be brought back under Mus-
lim domination. Thus, at a mammoth con-
gregation of Markaz supporters in Novem-
ber 1999, the a m i r Hafiz Muhammad S ace e d
declared: 'Today I announce the break-up of
India, I n s h a l l a h. We will not rest until the
whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan.'
The Lashkar's direct participation in the
Kashmir conflict dates back to the end of
the Afghan war in 1992 when the Lashkar
shifted its attention to Kashmir. In this, it
was assisted by the J a m aca t - i - I s l a m i of Pak-
istan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Despite the limited support of Ahl-i-Hadith-
style Islamic purism in Kashmir, the Lashkar
has today emerged as the single most pow-
erful militant group in the region, owing
principally to the arms and resources that it
commands. In contrast to the earlier Ahl-i-
Hadith activists in Kashmir, the Lashkar has
consciously refrained from engaging in
intra-Muslim disputes or from openly at-
tacking what it sees as 'un-Islamic' beliefs
and practices among the Kashmiri Muslims.
In this way it has sought to broaden its ap-
peal beyond the narrow and restricted circle
of Ahl-i-Hadith followers in the region. The
support for the Lashkar in Kashmir must,
then, be seen as essentially a result of its
stern opposition to Indian 'colonialism',
rather than as representing any consider-
able acceptance of its theological vision.
The current crisis
The American reprisals against the Tal-
iban, following the 11 September attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
have been fiercely opposed by Islamist
groups, including the Lashkar. In the wake
of the attacks, the Lashkar is said to have
despatched several of its armed volunteers
to Afghanistan, to supplement the 600
Lashkar special guards who had earlier been
specially appointed as personal security for
Usama bin Laden. The Lashkar condemned
the American assault on Afghanistan as the
launching of a new 'crusade' (salibi jang) b y
the 'Christian' West against the Muslim
world. The head of the Markaz sternly
warned Pakistani President General Pervez
Musharraf not to cooperate with America,
and issued a thinly veiled threat, calling for
defiance of the government if it continued
to toe the American line. The head Mufti of
the Markaz issued a fatwa claiming it a bind-
ing duty on all Muslims to help their Afghan
co-religionists. If Pakistan's rulers continued
to support America this would be treated as
a gross violation of Islam, and they would be
considered as 'rebels and traitors of Allah
and His prophet'. Usama bin Laden, it assert-
ed, had now become 'the symbol of jihad all
over the world'. In the on-going 'war be-
tween Islam and k u f r [disbelief]', led by
Usama, it laid down, 'it has become obliga-
tory for all the Muslim states in the interest
of the dignity of Islam and the Muslims to
[…] forge unity in their own ranks and send
their armies to support j i h a d and the m u-
j a h i d i n. '
The implications of the American inter-
vention in Afghanistan and the downfall of
the Taliban for the Lashkar are not clear as
yet. Pakistan's President General Musharraf,
under pressure from the US, has been trying
to reign in certain Islamist groups, but it ap-
pears that this is proving to be largely un-
successful. Widespread opposition in Pak-
istan and Kashmir against the American at-
tacks on Afghanistan are an indication that
many resent Musharraf's pro-American
stance, but whether this would translate
into greater support for Lashkar-style Is-
lamist radicalism is a moot question. 
The Lashkar is affiliated to the Ahl-i-Hadith
school of thought, a reformist Islamic move-
ment, which had its origins in early 19t h- c e n-
tury India. The founders of the Ahl-i-Hadith
believed that they were charged with the di-
vine responsibility of purging popular Mus-
lim practice of what they saw as un-Islamic
accretions and borrowings from their Hindu
neighbours. They insisted that Muslims re-
turn to the original sources of their faith and
abandon all beliefs and practices not sanc-
tioned therein. They called for Muslims to
abide strictly by the s h a r ica and to abandon
'imitation' ( t a q l i d ) of the schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. Besides, the Ahl-i-Hadith also
bitterly critiqued Sufism, which they saw as
a b i dca, for, they argued, it had no sanction
in the practice of the Prophet. Given the im-
mense popularity of the Sufi traditions and
the influence of the Hanafi cu l a m a a m o n g
the Muslims of South Asia, it was hardly sur-
prising that the Ahl-i-Hadith faced stiff op-
position, being banned from worship at
mosques and condemned as apostates and
'enemies of Islam'. For their part, the Ahl-i-
Hadith appeared to have revelled in contro-
versy, not losing any opportunity of attack-
ing their Muslim opponents for what they
branded as their 'un-Islamic' ways.
Expanding its base
Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947,
the Ahl-i-Hadith began making gradual
progress in the country, establishing
mosques and madrasas of its own. It tended
to have a more visible presence in urban
areas, its strict scripturalist literalism appeal-
ing to groups such as urban traders who
were not tied down to local Sufi shrines.
From the 1980s onwards the Ahl-i-Hadith
was able to make considerable inroads in
Pakistani society following the rapid expan-
N o t e
* The quotations are taken the following sites:
www.lashkertaiba.net; jammu-kashmir.com;
www.dawacenter.com, and markazdawa.org
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